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Introduction
The Kangoye (2013) findings on the negative nexus between foreign aid unpredictability and governance could seriously affect debates in academic and policy making circles. The paper concludes: "This paper examines the effects of aid on governance from a different perspective by asserting that aid unpredictability can potentially increase corruption in recipient countries by providing incentives to risk-averse and corrupt political leaders to engage in rent-seeking activities. Analyses of data from 80 developing countries over the period 1984-2004 offer evidence that higher aid unpredictability is associated with more corruption as measured by a synthetic index. We also find further evidence that this latter impact is more severe in countries with weak initial institutional conditions. These findings are a supplementary advocacy for the need for better management and better predictability of aid flow in developing countries" (p.
121). Our interest in the underlying paper is twofold: restricted use of the concept of governance and a recently celebrated Eubank (2012) hypothesis.
First, restricting the concept of governance to corruption could be misleading. Accordingly, while corruption is employed as the dependent variable of interest, governance is used on the title. We recalibrate the concept of governance into political, economic and institutional dynamics. Consistent with Kaufmann et al. (2010) as recently employed in the literature (Andrés & Asongu, 2013; Andrés et al., 2014) , governance is political (voice & accountability and political stability/no violence), economic (governance effectiveness and regulation quality), institutional (corruption-control and rule of law) and general (political, economic and institutional) . We use these governance dynamics in our study to extend the underpinning paper.
Second, after the Bottom Billion (Collier, 2007) and Dead Aid (Moyo, 2009) , inter alia, that have been critically engaged in academic and policy making circles, the Eubank (2012) Somaliland-based hypothesis has been recently celebrated with the best paper award from the Journal of Development Studies in 2013. Consistent with the author, the government depends on local taxpayers for revenue in exchange for better governance standards. Hence, according to the narrative, taxpayers have the leverage to demand for better governance standards. The theoretical underpinnings of the hypothesis are deeply rooted in the history of economic thought. It has foundations in negotiations between autocratic governments who needed tax income (to survive inter-state wars) and citizens who were willing only to consent to taxation if there was better governance and delivery of public commodities.
In light of the above, it is interesting to engage how the above two underpinning points converge to give substance to the motivation of this paper. Two main axes of convergence boldly standout: (1) Somaliland is not eligible for foreign aid but has relatively better governance standards and; (2) the Kangoye (2013) findings run counter to the intuition of Eubank (2012 (Stoddard, 2014) . Second, the Kangoye findings for developing countries run counter to the Eubank hypothesis which has recently been confirmed in Africa (Asongu, 2014a) . Accordingly, foreign aid uncertainty could be assimilated to a situation where domestic government starts anticipating of resorting to more local tax revenues to compensate for the potential negative gap in foreign aid. Hence, the State should be predisposed to improving its governance standards in exchange for or anticipation of more local tax income. The Eubank hypothesis come-in at this juncture.
Unfortunately, the Kangoye findings have suggested the contrary. We address this puzzle by postulation that the contradiction is based on the limited scope of the concept of governance, which is restricted to corruption. Hence, we hypothesize that the Eubank hypothesis might be confirmed in more exhaustive contexts of political, economic, institutional and general governance.
The procedure of verifying our postulations consists of three main steps. First, we confirm the Kangoye findings with the concept of corruption as the main indicator of governance.
Second, we extend the conception of governance to political, economic, institutional and general dimensions using the six principal government quality dynamics, notably: political stability and voice & accountability (political); government effectiveness and regulation quality (economic); corruption-control and rule of law (institutional); and general (political, economic & institutional) . Third, we replicate the approach that has confirmed the Kangoye findings to assess if his results are confirmed in the broader spectrum of governance. In other words, if the Eubank intuition is validated.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and the methodology. The empirical analysis and discussion of results are covered in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Data and Methodology

Data
We examine a sample of 53 African countries using annual from African Development The independent variable of interest is net official development assistance (NODA). In order to add subtlety to the analysis for robustness purposes, we add: (1) NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (NODADAC) and; (2) NODA from Multilateral Donors (NODAMD). The distortions are computed using two approaches: (1) simple standard deviations of three-year intervals and; (2) standard errors or standard deviations of the saved residuals after first-order autoregressive processes in the NODA dynamics. The latter approach is consistent with Kangoye.
The choice of three non-overlapping intervals (NOI) has a fourfold justification. First, one degree of freedom is lost after computation of residuals in the first-order autoregressive process and at least two periods are needed for standard deviations of the residuals to be further computed. Second, averages mitigate short-run or business cycle disturbances that may loom substantially large. Third, 3 year NOI ensure that the basic conditions for the employment of Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) are well satisfied (N>T: 53>5). Fourth, 3 year NOI restrict overidentification or limit instrument proliferation by ensuring that the number of crosssections are higher than the number of instruments.
We control for inflation, trade openness, economic prosperity and government expenditure. Whereas the role of government expenditure is consistent with fiscal behavior in governance (Eubank, 2012; Asongu & Jellal, 2013) , globalization in terms of trade openness has been documented to improve governance (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012; Asongu, 2014b) .
Economic prosperity and income-levels are instrumental in the quality of government (Asongu, 2012, p. 191) . The sign of inflation on governance remains ambiguous. It may be positive if measures put in place are designed to effectively improve government quality and correct the problem. On the other hand, it could substantially affect governance standards negatively if issues of soaring food prices remain unaddressed. The latter are among factors that culminated to the Arab Spring (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012) . We also employ time-effects in the specifications to further control for the unobserved heterogeneity.
Definition of the variables is presented in Appendix 1, the summary statistics disclosed in Appendix 2 and the correlation analysis in Appendix 3. From the first, the variables are comparable and based on the variations we could be confident that reasonable estimated relationships would emerge. The correlation analysis has been employed to mitigate multicollinearity and overparametization issues that could arise, especially among NODA distortion dynamics.
Methodology
The system GMM estimation strategy is adopted for a threefold interest: first, it accounts for potential endogeneity in all the regressors; second, cross-country regressions are eliminated in the estimation process and; biases in the difference estimation resulting from small samples are mitigated. Hence, it is substantially for this third point that we are consistent with Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4) in choosing the system GMM approach (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998 ) instead of the difference estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) . In the specification, a heteroscedasticity-consistent two-step approach is preferred to the homoscedasticity-consistent one-step procedure. Two tests are performed to ascertain the validity of the models, notably: the Sargan over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test for instrument validity and; the Arellano & Bond autocorrelation (AR (2)) test for the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals. The interests of using data averages in terms of 3 year NOI have already been discussed in the data section.
The following equations in levels and first difference represent the GMM approach.
Where: 't' denotes the period and 'i' stands for a country. Gov is Governance; T , Total NODA; DAC , NODA from DAC countries; MD , NODA from Multilateral Donors; X is the set of control variables (Trade openness, Government expenditure, Inflation and GDP growth); i  is a country-specific effect; t  is a time-specific constant and;
 an error term. The estimation procedure involves jointly estimating the regression in levels (Eq. (1)) with that in first-difference (Eq. (2)), hence exploiting all the parallel or orthogonality conditions between the the error term and the lagged endogenous variable.
Empirical results
Confirmation of empirical underpinnings
As outlined in the introduction, it is relevant to first confirm the findings of Kangoye using the same: definition of uncertainty and; corruption as the dependent governance variable.
The foreign aid distortions are standard errors (standard deviations of the residuals after firstorder autoregressive processes). In Table 1 below, the models are overwhelmingly valid because the null hypotheses of the Sargan OIR and AR(2) tests are overwhelmingly rejected 2 . The main findings are broadly consistent with the position that foreign aid uncertainty increases corruption.
In the interpretation, note should be taken of the fact that the CPI is reported in decreasing order such that, lower values denote higher levels of corruption. 
Requalification of governance
This section extends the definition of governance from corruption to political, economic, institutional and general dynamics. We use principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the dimensions of each governance dynamic because some information may be redundant owing to the high degrees of substitution. PCA is a widely employed statistical method that consists of reducing a set of highly correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables called principal components that reflect a substantial variation or proportion of initial information. We first reduce all the governance indicators to obtained a general governance measurement before further mitigating them into: voce & accountability and political stability for political governance (PolGov); government effectiveness and regulation quality for economic governance (EcoGov) and; corruption-control and rule of law for institutional governance (InstGov).
The Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) criterion are employed to determine common factors. They recommend stopping at first principal components (PCs) with an eigen value greater than the mean (or unity). In this light, as shown in Table 2 Institutional governance represents the respect for citizens and the state of institutions that govern the interactions among them. In Table 4 below, specifications of Table 3 
Distortions as standard deviations
Distortions as standard errors
Tables 5-6 below address the underlying problem using standard errors as distortions instead of standard deviations. The standard errors are computed as the standard deviations of the residuals saved from the first-order autoregressive processes. The Eubank hypothesis is broadly confirmed for political and general governance. 
